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THE AGE OF DISORDER:  
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN COVID TIMES
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I. COVID-19: GAME-CHANGER OR ACCELERATOR? II. LACK OF 
LEADERSHIP. III. THE DISENCHANTMENT OF MULTILATERALISM. IV. 
THE RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS. V. THE POST COVID-19 SCENARIO. VI. A 
NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER?
I. COVID-19: GAME-CHANGER OR ACCELERATOR?
As a consequence of  the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
pandemic2, the international community is facing a substantial crisis that is 
likely to generate significant mutations in the international order as we know 
it. The pandemic has come to remind us in a clear and unquestionable way of  
the vulnerability of  people and the planet to global threats.
This crisis has contributed to accelerating the weaknesses of  multilateralism 
and a rules-based international order.3 This is not a situation created by the 
coronavirus, but something that had already been brewing for many years 
and that the pandemic has precipitated. Already in 2013 David Held told us 
1 Diplomat, Full Professor (Catedrático) of  Diplomatic Law and Practice at the Foreign Service 
Institute (Argentina), Associate Professor (Profesor Titular) of  International Law (University 
of  Buenos Aires, Argentina) and Full Professor (Catedrático) of  Diplomatic and Consular 
Theory and Practice (University of  Belgrano, Argentina). Email: ricardoarredondo@derecho.
uba.ar.
2 This is the expression used by Res. 74/270, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
on 2 April 2020, Doc. A/RES/74/270).
3 Arredondo, R., “La ausencia del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas”, Clarín, 
Buenos Aires, 15 April 2020.
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about a paralysis or stalemate in the globalization process and wondered about 
the causes of  why international cooperation was failing when it was most 
needed.4 Held and his colleagues Thomas Hale and Kevin Young observed 
that multilateralism seemed to fail in the face of  planetary challenges such 
as protecting the environment, international trade, and security. The central 
argument of  this work was that the postwar multilateral order promoted 
an extraordinary phase of  economic and social progress, which in turn 
increased interdependence between countries, establishing the conditions for 
the emergence of  global challenges of  unprecedented complexity, although 
ultimately it ended up affecting the ability of  international institutions to 
respond to these challenges.
It is in this context that the current backlash against globalization and 
the perceived withdrawal of  liberalism must be understood. This refractory 
movement can be observed in various exogenous factors, external to the liberal 
international order of  the second postwar period, and endogenous, that is, 
originated by internal causes of  that order. Without going into an exhaustive 
analysis, among the former we can mention, among others, the rise of  China 
in the global order, the resurgence of  Russia and the failure of  the “Arab 
Spring”. Among the latter, understood as an rebuff  to the Western liberal 
values, we see the loss of  faith in democracy and the core values of  liberalism, 
the rise of  populism on both the right and the left, the emergence of  
strongly nationalist movements such as Brexit and the emergence of  pseudo-
democratic governments with a strong imprint of  authoritarianism, which 
some like Madeleine Albright describe as fascist.5
The way globalization has developed has also spawned many forms of  
discontent and backlash dynamics6, from the revival of  a more sovereignty-
focused vision by China7 and Russia8 to the resurgence of  unilateralism in 
4 HAle, T., Held, d., Young, K.,Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation is Failing when We Need It 
Most, Wiley, 2013.
5 AlbrigHT, M., Fascism. A Warning, Harper, 2018.
6 STigliTz, J. E., Globalization and Its Discontents, Norton, 2003.
7 Council on Foreign Relations Infoguide, “China’s Approach to Global Governance”, 2020, 
available at https://www.cfr.org/china-global-governance/ (access 5/10/2020).
8 CAnTelmi, M., “China y Rusia, o cuando el Oso y el Dragón se van juntos a la cama”, Clarín, 
Buenos Aires, 27 de septiembre de 2019.
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the United States9 and the growing ultranationalist and populist movements, 
both on the right and on the left, in Europe as well as in other parts of  the 
world. The dangerous, chauvinistic and racist attitudes that have marked these 
movements, for example towards migrants and refugees, threaten many of  the 
basic norms and values of  the liberal international order.
The coronavirus pandemic has acted as a catalyst for all of  these processes 
and, as Hague points out, precipitated transformations that could have 
continued to unfold slowly over 20 years or more.10
II. LACK OF LEADERSHIP
Another element that COVID-19 has come to highlight is the absence of  
clear leadership in the international community. The United States, which had 
led in previous crises such as the financial crisis of  2008 or the Ebola epidemic 
in 2014, that “indispensable nation”11 of  which Albright spoke to us in the 90s 
and Obama a few years ago, has abdicated its claim to global leadership.12 It has 
not done so in the face of  this pandemic. The United States has been absent 
since Trump took office in January 2017, showing his manifest disinterest in 
multilateralism and a rules-based international order. In a clear attack on that 
international order that the United States itself  built after World War II, the 
Trump administration carried out what Haass describes as a “diplomacy of  
withdrawal”13 that resulted in the abandonment of  numerous organizations, 
forums and international treaties. As soon as he assumed his mandate, Trump 
announced that the United States would not be part of  the Trans-Pacific 
Trade Agreement, then withdrew the United States from the Human Rights 
Council, stopped providing funds for Palestine refugees (UNWRA), reduced 
9 nYe, Jr., JoSepH, S., “Is Trump a Turning Point in World Politics?”, Project Syndicate, 1 
September 2020.
10 HAgue, W., “Coronavirus has accelerated eight mega-trends that will transform everything”, 
The Telegraph, London, 20 April 2020.
11 oneA, T., “The Indispensable Nation and US Unilateralism”, in Onea, T., US Foreign Policy 
in the Post-Cold War Era, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
12 dAAlder, i. H., lindSAY, J. m., The Empty Throne: America’s Abdication of  Global Leadership, 
Public Affairs, 2018.
13 HAASS, R. N., “Trump’s Foreign Policy Doctrine? The Withdrawal Doctrine”, Washington 
Post, 27 May 2020.
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his contribution to the Organization of  American States (OAS), withdrew 
from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the agreement to achieve 
the denuclearization of  Iran, the agreement on intermediate nuclear forces 
(known INF) and the Open Skies treaty, among many other actions aimed 
at undermining multilateral institutions and global governance, including the 
paralysis of  the dispute settlement system of  the World Trade Organization. In 
the midst of  this pandemic, he first announced a cut in funds to the WHO and 
in early July he sent a note to Congress requesting authorization to completely 
leave this organization.14
China has also shown no interest in leading in the face of  the pandemic. 
While it managed to control the outbreak, it has been criticized for its initial 
failure to act transparently and effectively to prevent the spread of  the virus.15 
This will not be easy to forget or forgive, notwithstanding that Beijing seeks 
to redress the damage through its active “mask diplomacy”, providing aid and 
advice to many states.16
III. THE DISENCHANTMENT OF MULTILATERALISM
The United Nations, the forum that should “serve as a center that 
harmonizes the efforts of  nations to achieve these common purposes” (art. 
1.4 of  the Charter), has been a site where the competition for primacy and 
power in the global order has been revealed in a particularly acute way.
The first reaction came from the Secretary General of  the Organization, 
António Guterres, who on March 23 characterized the pandemic as the 
most challenging crisis since World War II and called for an “an immediate 
global ceasefire in all corners of  the world”.17 Subsequently, through different 
messages and efforts, he tried to highlight how COVID-19 has long exceeded 
14 Arredondo, R., “El asalto de Trump al derecho internacional: su impacto en la OMC”, 
Revista Peruana de Derecho Internacional, Tomo LXX mayo-agosto 2020, N° 165, pp. 197-225.
15 miller, P. D., “Yes, Blame China for the Virus”, Foreign Policy, 25 March 2020.
16 FuCHS, A. (et al.), “China’s mask diplomacy: Political and business ties facilitate access to 
critical medical goods during the coronavirus pandemic”, VoxEU.org, 16 September 2020, 
available at https://voxeu.org/article/china-s-mask-diplomacy (access 5/10/2020).
17 guTerreS, A., “The fury of  the virus illustrates the folly of  war”, available at https://www.
un.org/en/un-coronavirus-communications-team/fury-virus-illustrates-folly-war.
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its nature as a health crisis and its effects have spread to politics, the economy, 
social relations and the environment, among others.
However, and perhaps conscious of  the internal divisions in the Security 
Council, he did not use the powers conferred upon him by the Charter to bring 
to its attention “any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance 
of  international peace and security” (art. 99).
On April 2, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 74/270, by which 
it reaffirmed its support for international cooperation and multilateralism in 
the global response to the coronavirus, underlining the central role of  the 
United Nations. In this regard, it urged the United Nations system, under the 
direction of  the Secretary General, to work with all relevant entities in order to 
mobilize a coordinated global response to the pandemic and its adverse social, 
economic and financial consequences for all countries and societies. This 
resolution recognizes the crucial role played by WHO in the global response 
and calls for the application of  the relevant guidelines recommended by the 
agency. This suggestion was supported by many members, approved by the 
United States, and then accepted by China.
As a response to the refractory measures adopted by several States at the 
beginning of  the pandemic,18 on April 20, the General Assembly adopted, at 
the proposal of  Mexico, resolution 74/27419 on international cooperation to 
guarantee, under equal conditions, global access to medicines, vaccines and 
medical equipment to deal with COVID-19, which had massive support.
The Security Council, due to disagreements among its permanent members, 
took 111 days to reach the necessary consensus that would allow it to adopt 
a resolution on the matter. The impertinence of  the US administration in 
calling the coronavirus “Chinese virus”, “Wuhan virus” or “Kung-flu”20 and 
its insistence on holding China responsible for its emergence, in addition to 
generating reactions of  discrimination, racism and xenophobia at various 
points of  the planet, obviously produced the rejection of  the Chinese 
government, which threatened to veto any type of  resolution that had a 
language of  that nature. On the other hand, the negotiations dragged on 
18 Arredondo, R., “La diplomacia de la COVID-19”, La Gaceta, Tucumán, 28 April 2020.
19 Res. 74/274, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 20 April 2020, Doc. A/
RES/74/274.
20 bbC newS, “Trump angers Beijing with ‘Chinese virus’ tweet”, 17 March 2020, available 
at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-51928011.
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largely due to differences between China and the United States on whether to 
include a reference to the World Health Organization (WHO) in the text of  
the resolution, something that Beijing favored and the United States opposed.
The initial paralysis of  the Security Council, which recalls the Cold War 
times, accentuated the lack of  world leadership to seek a way out through 
international cooperation, the only effective instrument, to this global crisis. On 
July 1, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2532 (2020) which expresses 
grave concern about the devastating impact of  the pandemic worldwide, 
especially in countries ravaged by armed conflict, in post-conflict situations or 
affected by humanitarian crises and supports the Secretary-General’s call for a 
global ceasefire to address the COVID-19 crisis for a period of  90 consecutive 
days to allow the delivery of  humanitarian assistance.
However, it affirms that this general and immediate cessation of  hostilities 
and this humanitarian pause “do not apply to military operations against the 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh), Al Qaeda 
and Al Nusra Front (ANF), and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and 
entities associated with Al Qaeda or ISIL, and other terrorist groups, which 
have been designated by the Security Council”.
This call for a universal truce had already received strong support from 
most of  the Organization’s Member States, including United States main allies, 
as well as the Alliance for Multilateralism, which issued a joint statement on 
April 16, endorsed by 193 countries, human rights groups, charities and the 
Pope. However, less than a week later the Security Council was again bogged 
down over the reopening of  humanitarian corridors in northern Syria, first 
due to the veto of  China and Russia to the draft German resolution that 
proposed the reopening and to the next day, not approving the draft resolution 
proposed by Russia.
IV. THE RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS
Although Don Herzog and others give up for dead the traditional 
conception of  sovereignty21, paraphrasing Louis Henkin we could affirm that 
21 Herzog, D., Sovereignty RIP, Yale University Press, 2020.
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the reports of  the death of  the Westphalian notion of  sovereignty are greatly 
exaggerated.22
The response to the pandemic has been varied, from States that have 
turned in on themselves, seeking individual solutions to others that have 
shown solidarity and offered cooperation. The provision of  sanitary materials 
and equipment by China to European and African countries, called the “mask 
diplomacy”, was later replicated by the United States, which has contributed 
respirators for African countries, in an attempt to reclaim the space won 
by China on this continent. Russia sent a plane full of  personal protective 
equipment to the United States, in addition to sending aid to Italy and Serbia. 
Meanwhile, South Korea and Taiwan have sent test materials and more than 
sixteen million masks to countries in America, Asia and Europe.
Even institutions favorable to multilateral and cooperative solutions, such 
as the European Union (EU) have exhibited internal divisions that in a first 
phase prevented their Member States from applying a common strategy until 
they adopted a joint “Roadmap” for recovery and reached an agreement to 
work towards the establishment of  a recovery fund aimed at the sectors and 
geographical areas most affected in Europe and be specific to address this 
crisis.
In the Americas, the Organization of  American States (OAS) has been 
absent. The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), as a branch of  WHO, 
has tried to implement some responses, whose prevention and treatment 
protocols have been accepted by many governments. In Latin America, the 
governments of  the region have adopted different solutions to a crisis that is 
deeper and longer than the forecasts anticipated.
The crisis of  regional governance mechanisms has conspired against the 
design of  a joint strategy. Mercosur has adopted certain formal measures, 
seeking to advance the integration agenda to overcome obstacles in the area 
of  trade and transport between the States Parties. Beyond the rhetoric, the few 
provisions adopted in this first half  of  2020 are an example and a consequence 
of  the ideological and positional rivalry in the face of  the coronavirus that has 
prevented substantial coordination among its members.
Subnational entities have played a valuable role in this crisis. While in some 
countries such as Argentina a joint and orderly policy of  support for federal 
22 HenKin, L., “The Reports of  the Death of  Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated”, 65 
American Journal of  International Law (1971), p. 544.
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government decisions to face the pandemic has been observed, other countries 
such as the United States or Brazil have witnessed a divergent paradiplomacy 
of  local governments, in open opposition, if  not defiance, to the directives 
emanating from the central government.
V. THE POST COVID-19 SCENARIO
The crisis will impact on the globalization process as we know it and will 
probably reduce support to it.23 The speed at which the virus spread around the 
world, thanks to economic interdependence, as well as tourism and travel, will 
be attributed to globalization and possibly generate reactions against it. One 
of  the most powerful myths of  globalization: that of  a world without borders 
has quickly dismantled itself  before the closing of  national and provincial 
borders, reaffirming the traditional notion of  state sovereignty.
However, those who predict a return to the pre-globalization era are also 
wrong. There is a strong degree of  imbrication among national economies that 
could be affected by the decision of  some countries to relocate the production 
of  goods that they currently import, since these value chains can hardly be 
dismantled without impacting production, costs, competitiveness and wages, 
among other factors. Contrary to those who see the crisis as a warning sign 
of  the dangers of  globalization and underline the virtues of  self-reliance, I 
believe that the pandemic vindicates supporters of  interdependence. The 
real argument of  interdependence theory is not that it prevents conflict, but 
that it makes it more costly for all parties in an interdependent relationship.24 
Notwithstanding this, a reformulation of  the rules of  the multilateral trading 
system will be necessary to prevent the decoupling of  economies that has 
already started from worsening.
COVID-19 has seriously undermined the credibility of  the United States 
globally and, particularly, that of  the Trump administration within the United 
States. This is outstandingly relevant in an election year. Although Trump 
seems unconcerned with international public opinion, many Americans, who 
still attach importance to values and principles have a sense of  helplessness 
over the attitude of  the current Head of  State. The US needs a strategy to 
23 ACHArYA, A., “How Coronavirus May Reshape the World Order”, The National Interest, 18 
April 2020.
24 KeoHAne, r. o., nYe, J.S., Power and Interdependence, Longman, 1997.
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transform globalization and overcome the strategic rivalry with China. This 
new diplomacy should establish a relationship of  friendship and cooperation 
and at the same time of  rivalry and competition between the United States 
and China, what is called “co-opetion” (cooperation-competition). Theories 
about the interaction between rivals focus on competition or cooperation, but 
not on the combination of  the two types of  interaction. However, this type 
of  relationship, which some call “frenemy” (friend-enemy), implies a situation 
in which the parties compete and cooperate simultaneously and reciprocally 
benefit from this ambivalent strategy. In this sense, it is good to recall that 
ideological differences have not been an obstacle to cooperation between the 
United States and China since the meeting between Nixon and Mao in 1972, 
although the current situation is completely different.
VI. A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER?
Heraclitus taught us that “No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it’s 
not the same river and he’s not the same man”. The corollary of  this expression, 
accurate and sagacious, is simple: history is dynamic and irreversible. It never 
goes backwards and its engine is change. Humanity will defeat the virus, but 
nothing will be the same. Neither does the international order. The new order 
that is being born is a product and response to the pandemic.
The coronavirus pandemic has served as a catalyst for divisions that have 
been undermining the international order for years and deepening them. 
COVID-19 in a way has contributed to “systematizing” the power relations 
that had been developing, exacerbating the rivalry between China and the 
United States and generating what some describe as an increase in “entropic 
bipolarism”.25 While the crisis comes with renewed calls for global solidarity, 
it remains to be seen whether the current multilateral system can respond 
effectively. If  that response depends on the attitude of  states, it is likely that 
some will use the crisis to further undermine multilateralism, as they are 
already doing, while others will seek a multilateral and cooperative solution. 
Multilateral institutions will remain an important part of  this conversation if, 
25 SCHweller, R. L., “The Age of  Entropy. Why the New World Order Won’t Be Orderly”, 
Foreign Affairs online, 16 June 2014; ACTiS, e., CreuS, N., “Un mundo acelerado. ¿Bipolaridad 
o nueva Guerra Fría?”, Nueva Sociedad, 20 June 2020, available at https://nuso.org/articulo/
China-Estados-Unidos-Guerra-fria/.
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in the future, they respond quickly and effectively, something they have not 
done so far. The threat is global and needs a global response.
The United Nations still remains mired with rivalries in the Security 
Council, disagreements and its relative ability to solve problems. The total 
confidence of  some states in their power and influence, with their tendency to 
act unilaterally, is another evidence of  the weakness of  the liberal international 
order. This pandemic has clearly established the failure of  these unilateral 
policies.
As Acharya points out, the loss of  US hard and soft power will accentuate 
the transition to a post-American order, which he calls “multiplex” 26 and 
proposes a multi-stakeholder problem-oriented world governance.27 An 
international order administered by “global clubs” that replace that order 
governed by a hegemon.
Today, perhaps more than ever in the last 75 years, it is necessary to build a 
framework that overcomes the current rivalries and creates the conditions for 
a more stable and secure world. Perhaps we need to exit from an international 
rules-based order and enter a deals-based order. This model could not come 
directly from existing multilateral institutions but from new coalitions of  
countries, with varying memberships depending on the type of  issue in 
question, seeking a new plurilateral but segmented system to address the 
weaknesses of  the current scheme. A hybrid model that gathers elements from 
existing institutions and redirects them towards new international cooperation 
schemes.
An example that illustrates this proposal is the decision of  a group of  forty 
countries to build an alternative trade dispute settlement system in the face of  
the paralysis of  the Appellate Body (AB) of  the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Faced with Trump’s decision to hinder the appointment of  new AB 
members and in order to overcome this obstacle to the functioning of  the 
WTO dispute settlement system, the European Union, China, Canada and 
others, including an important number of  Latin American countries (Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico and Uruguay), agreed to a multi-
26 ACHArYA, A., “After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of  a MultiplexWorld Order”, 31 Ethics 
& International Affairs (2017), pp. 271-285.
27 ACHArYA, A., “How Coronavirus May Reshape the World Order”, The National Interest, 18 
April 2020.
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party interim appeal arrangement (MPIA), based on current WTO rules.28 
The Alliance for Multilateralism, launched by Germany and France, also falls 
within this logic.29
The absence of  clear leadership, the lack of  an effective and rapid response 
from multilateral institutions and the demand to find solutions to new problems 
in order to avoid their exacerbation and, eventually, the conflict, invite us to 
think of  new mechanisms to overcome these challenges. New mechanisms and 
institutions are required to provide a coordinated and multilateral response to 
challenges of  a global nature such as climate change, pandemics, cyberattacks, 
hunger and poverty, just to name a few. As Juan Rulfo once envisioned: “Nos 
salvamos juntos o nos hundimos separados”.
28 European Commission, “The WTO multi-party interim appeal arrangement gets 
operational”, 3 August 2020, available at https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.
cfm?id=2176.
29 See https://multilateralism.org/.
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